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**THE APRA PARTY OF PERU;  
A STUDY OF ITS GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT  
INTO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY**

by

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## 1. Introduction

Alianza Popular Revolucionaria America (APRA). For over six decades this has meant many different things to Peruvians. In its early stages it meant student activism, workers' rights and promises of a new social order. To others it represented a dangerous and violent force which corrupted a genuine reform movement and gave rise to military rule. In the fifties, APRA represented broken promises and stagnation. To others, it was a party who was finally finding a legitimate place in Peruvian politics after years of struggle against the structural realities of Peru. In the eighties it was a sign of hope for millions of Peruvians against desperate poverty and government bureaucracy. To others, it was a dangerous wing back towards confrontation and revolution.

The confusion surrounding APRA and its political position since its founding in 1924 is astounding and the search for any sort of clear, straight-forward explanation has proven elusive to scholars.

There are certain trends and characteristics of APRA, however, that have been consistent and regular. First, the importance of a charismatic leader. Haya de la Torre, who founded the party in 1924, was the centerpiece of APRA, enjoying unquestioned authority and influence within the party. Second, the core of the middle-class support for APRA from its birthplace in the stronghold in the northern Peruvian city of Trujillo. This sector of the electorate has consistently delivered one-third of the vote to APRA candidates. Conversely, APRA has

not received regular support from the urban lower-class or Indians, despite APRA rhetoric aimed at them. Third, the tradition of antipathy between APRA and the military. The military has historically made it very difficult for APRA to gain power. Finally, there has always been a division within APRA concerning the direction in which the party was to move. Many Apristas felt strongly that APRA should be a violent, confrontational movement dedicated to the removal of the oligarchy and military. Others believed APRA had to moderate its approach and work with the ruling elite to guarantee its own political survival.

These traditional APRA characteristics held true until the emergence of Alan Garcia in 1982. His transformation into a leader after the death of Haya de la Torre was a difficult one, but through this process, many of the historic problems and limitations of APRA were overcome.

This paper will trace the history of APRA with a forward-looking perspective, discussing what political patterns were established, where the roots of the problems within the party began and what sort of party Alan Garcia inherited in 1982 as he tried to establish unity. In addition, the structural and political problems within Peru and their effect on APRA will be mentioned.

The second half of this paper will concern itself with the inner-rivalries of APRA after the death of Haya de la Torre in 1979 as many of the historic problems within APRA manifested themselves during this period. The final section will analyze

the first months of the Garcia administration, reviewing the effectiveness and political strategy of his reforms.

## 2. Latin American Populism and APRA

In many ways APRA is a typical Latin American populist movement of the 20th century with foundations of multi-class support, integration of the disenfranchised and poor into the political process, emphasis on popular culture and a charismatic leader in full control of the movement.<sup>1</sup>

APRA, however, diverged from this model in two important ways. Firstly, it drew most of its support from the rural middle-class of the north, not from the urban proletariat as in the case of most populist parties. Secondly, and more importantly, was been a gradual movement within APRA to become more receptive to coalitions with whatever government was in power in Peru.<sup>2</sup> These coalitions were accompanied with a more conservative and status-quo policy, which sacrificed original and APRA policy of confrontation with the ruling elite and establishment of a new social order.

This conflict between APRA's ideological doctrines of confrontation and change versus political realities and political survival has been a historic problem for the party and will serve as one of the underlying themes of this paper as I trace the history of APRA into the eighties and the rise of Alan Garcia. The conflicts within the party, heightened in the years after World War Two, were a manifestation of basic ideological differences among party rank and file and repercussions from the

hard political choices made by APRA's leader Haya de la Torre. The division and confusion within APRA was demonstrated through fluctuations between APRA confrontation and compromise with the ruling elite, which have caused problems within APRA and in the political system of Peru as well.

To truly understand APRA, it is important to investigate the history of the party and the populist movement in Latin America in general. William Kornhauser defines populism as a situation in which, "large numbers of people engage in political activity outside of the procedures and rules instituted by a society to govern political action."<sup>3</sup> Mass movements, of which populism is one, are based on mobilizing uprooted and atomized sectors of the population by offering a larger share of the economic or political pie. In most cases populism appears to take root in a social and political climate subject to rapid and dramatic changes, where the political system is unable to digest the new demands of society.<sup>4</sup> This frustration is expressed in extra-institutional forms of political activity like populism. Populism is based on a group which, at a certain breaking point between tradition and modernization, begins to realize that it is underprivileged and ignored politically. These classes or strata are most commonly migrant peasants, urban workers and other lower-class members, although populism enjoys multi-class support and draws from a wide sector of society. Populism has no specific ideology, although classic populism tends to emphasize agriculture, traditional society and restoration, regeneration, renovation and reintegration of society's political and social structures. Nationalism and a charismatic leader also are

characteristic of populist movements.

In Latin America, populism fully emerged in the early 20th century with roots extending back to the first Spanish conquests and subsequent centralization of wealth into the hands of an elite few. In the late 19th and early 20th century there was an economic upswing which favored a considerable expansion in foreign trade, shifting the traditional channels of commerce and economic development. This led to unbalanced development with a huge influx of people and capital into those urban areas which experienced the most dynamic growth. This new export-led reorientation of the economy, particularly in agriculture and mining, laid the foundations for a new urban proletariat whose aspirations were to become more involved in politics and receive a larger piece of the growing economic pie.

Populism flourished in post-World War Two Latin America as mass movements sprung up in Venezuela, Costa Rica and Argentina, promising economic growth, political integration for the disenfranchised and hope for millions. Throughout the thirties and fifties populism grew and expanded its membership. In the late fifties, however, populism was not making the electoral strides it had hoped for and was not able to provide the services it had promised.<sup>5</sup> In addition, there was a growing tendency on the left in Latin America to use violence to gain political goals, as in Cuba in 1957, which led to the rise of military regimes in the sixties to control the unrest. In the seventies and eighties there has been revival of populism and a liberalization of the political system as economies faltered and



the military regimes lost credibility and legitimacy.

Many of these trends in Latin American populism can be seen in Peru as well. The most important precursor was Manuel Gonzales Prada, a turn of the century reformist and politician, who espoused labor and Indian rights. APRA was not the first group to have a populist nature, as seen in the earlier roots of the movement. However, it has been one of the most organized and consistent.

### 3. Early APRA and Haya de la Torre

Any discussion of APRA must begin with Haya de la Torre. Born into a middle-class family in the northern town of Trujillo, Haya came to Lima as a young man in 1920 and quickly became involved in student politics at San Marcos University. By 1923 he was organizing revolts against the government of President Augusto Leguia. Haya was deported to Mexico in 1923 where he would spend the next eight years. During those years he travelled throughout the west, exposing himself to a variety of political personalities and schools of thought, including Marxism.<sup>6</sup> In 1924 Haya officially founded APRA and began to refine his own ideological and political views. During his absence Haya was made a martyr and began to develop a cult-type following among Peruvians. Haya was a rallying point against the repression and discrimination of President Leguia.

Upon his return to Peru in 1930 for the presidential elections, Haya attempted to rally voters through the presentation of The Five Points of APRA:

1. Action Against Imperialism
  2. Political Unity of Latin America
  3. Nationalization of Land and Industry
  4. Internationalization of the Panama Canal
  5. Solidarity with all Oppressed Peoples
- 7

More importantly, these five points were designed to provide an ideological base for APRA. "The Maximum Program" presented by APRA for the same election emphasized social mobilization and political participation for those out of power and discriminated against. The Program was nationalistic, espousing an active anti-imperialist stance and a desire for Peru to control its own economic fortunes. Haya expanded on the idea:

What Aprismo considers ruinous for Peru is that in our need for capital, the country is converted into a slave of this capital and instead of this capital serving the country, the country becomes its servant. <sup>8</sup>

"Capital" here obviously refers to foreign capital.

As far as specific reform ideas, APRA favored a reorganization of provincial boundaries to follow economic criteria, including local autonomy, expansion of voting rights and decentralization. Crucial proposals included socialization of agricultural land, the establishment of cooperatives and the redemption of the native Indians by incorporating them into political life without the loss of their indigenous culture. APRA was also a strong supporter of labor, in favor of decreasing work hours and more extensive labor laws. APRA favored a modernization of the armed forces and a clear separation between church and state.<sup>9</sup>

APRA was also very specific about the criteria for membership into the party and highly organized. Each Aprista was part of two basic structures: the sector, which was a territorial

unit and the cell, which was based on the member's place in the labor process. The sectors were coordinated at the national level while the cells were divided into commandos, made up of students, workers, teachers, doctors, and other workers. There was rigid organization and discipline within the ranks.<sup>10</sup> This strong, grass-roots nature of APRA would carry into the eighties and has much to do with the consistent electoral support for Aprista candidates over time. However, the same organization, combined with heavy symbolism, (APRA flag, hymns, salute and motto) were probably responsible for the fascist image of the party in its early stages,<sup>11</sup> and the almost religious-like faith to APRA and the leadership of Haya by its members. In addition, the elitist following led to alienation of other sectors in Peruvian society, as we shall see.

APRA also promised a new social order for its members. If they satisfied the difficult membership qualifications, Apristas were then expected to modify their personal as well as political lifestyles. APRA stressed order, cleanliness of mind and body, dedication and self-control. Handbooks were published which specified exactly how an Aprista should behave.<sup>12</sup>

One area which APRA doctrine was weak and underdeveloped was exactly how to gain political power. Haya provided a broad framework for the acquisition of power:

Anyone can lay hands on the government palace, for the road leading to it is bought with gold or seized by force of arms. But the assignment of Aprismo is to find the road to the consciousness of the people, rather than the one to the palace.<sup>13</sup>

One must assume that APRA planned to use instruction, education and political integration to gain power. This lack of a specific plan for power was a handicap to APRA, lending some scholars to accuse the party of preferring to remain an outlaw movement rather than take on the responsibilities of actual government.

We cannot leave the discussion of the foundations of APRA without mentioning the obvious link between Marxism and Aprismo. There is little question that Haya de la Torre and the party were deeply affected by Marxism. Peruvian Marxist leader Jose Mariategui was a member of APRA, a comrade of Haya and involved in student riots of the twenties. However, Mariategui split from the party in the thirties declaring himself a convinced Marxist.

APRA accepted many of the foundations of Marxism, but was more pragmatic in actual application. Attempting to explain the Aprista brand of Marxism, Haya explained:

...just as Bolshevism or Marxism-Leninism is a combination of Marxist Socialism and Russian reality, so is Aprismo or Aprisma- Marxism a combination of Marxist socialism and the reality at Indo-America.<sup>14</sup>

Haya went further to say, "We accept in Marxist terms the division of society into classes and struggle of those classes as an expression of the process of history."<sup>15</sup>

However, APRA did not carry Marxist doctrine to fruition, preferring to use the philosophy in different ways throughout APRA's history. The most fundamental difference between APRA-style Marxism and the Marxism of Mariategui was that APRA leaders felt the proletariat was too weak for effective political

mobilization and preferred to work through the middle class.<sup>16</sup>

#### 4. 1930's and Violence

As APRA made its first bid in electoral politics in 1931, it was apparent that APRA was not going to operate to the letter of its original doctrine. In 1930, Colonel Sanchez Cerro overthrew the Leguia government, but was forced to call for a general election in 1931. Haya returned and campaigned heavily, only to lose to Cerro, who edged out Haya by attracting the bulk of the Lima electorate.

It became clear in the thirties that, " the main endeavor of APRA was to win the support of the Peruvian middle-class, which began to emerge in the twenties as a potentially important source of political and economic power."<sup>17</sup> Haya characterized the proletariat in the following words:

... A class still in formation, it has no consciousness. In its great majority it is composed of rural laborers who are illiterate. It lacks both the consciousness of class and the cultural level which have characterized the proletariat of more advanced capitalist countries. On the other hand, there is a middle class, made up of artisans and peasants who own means of production, mining and industrial works, small capitalists and landowners and merchants. To this class belong also the intellectual workers, the professionals, the technicians. It is this middle group that is being pushed towards ruination by the process of imperialism. Consequently, there is no opportunity for our middle class. This, then, is the abused class that will lead the revolution.<sup>18</sup>

APRA placed more emphasis upon development and recruitment of the middle class, particularly through the union, where APRA

made impressive membership gains in Haya's native Trujillo and the textile workers of Lima.

Historian Carlos Astiz described the roots of APRA support:

It was among the lower and middle class that APRA developed its following and where APRA ideology, backed by the charisma of Haya, made its most impressive gains.<sup>19</sup>

APRA established a strong base of support among the sugar workers in the northern region of La Libertad, where Trujillo is located. Between 1870 and 1932, much of the agricultural property in that region was consolidated into three large sugar enterprises. Many small farmers lost their land and whatever economic influence they might have had. The port facilities were taken over by the large sugar company of Casa Grande, which enabled them to control the imports and exports of the region, displacing merchants and traders. The anger spread through various sectors of society, including influential journalists and businessmen.<sup>20</sup> Support from the La Libertad region has been the most consistent source of electoral power for APRA. For example, in the 1931 elections, 76.44 percent in the region voted for Haya de la Torre. In the 1963 election, 75.29 percent were for Haya, demonstrating electoral consistency.<sup>21</sup>

The majority of the remaining support for APRA in its beginning stages came from those areas which experienced dislocations of the frustrated merchants, farmers and workers from the La Libertad region. These areas include central Peru and parts of the coastline.

Conversely, despite much APRA rhetoric aimed at the migrant, and Indian population, the party was not successful in gaining

their support. In spite of the fact that the party's leader coined the phrase "Indoamerica", APRA's support among the Indians has always been lukewarm, rarely making any large gains. Also, APRA has not consistently done well in Lima, especially among the migrant workers immigrating from sierra to the city. Although difficult to explain, it may be due to the closed and elitist nature of APRA combined with the party's own emphasis on attracting the middle class vote. APRA's strength, "is based on the plantations and the lower middle class of the coastal cities."<sup>22</sup>

After losing the 1931 elections, APRA became more hostile and demonstrative. There was a wave of accusations of fraud in the elections by Apristas, followed by violent outbursts and strikes. In July of 1932 one thousand APRA faithful stormed the army barracks in Trujillo, killing sixty soldiers and officials. Government soldiers were called in and surrounded the city, eventually killing at least one thousand Apristas. In addition, a young Aprista shot and wounded Cerro in a Lima suburb. This violent outburst by APRA, which was denied by some top party officials, is important in three ways. First, it began a trend of APRA violence and confrontation which would not end until the fifties. Second, a division was apparent within the party, demonstrated by the denial of involvement in the uprisings by some party officials, over which direction the party should move politically. Finally, a wedge was driven between the military and APRA which would not mellow until the seventies.

Certain political realities of Peru should also be mentioned. The overwhelming tradition in Peru has been the

political domination by the oligarchy and the military. Until the mid-sixties, the military was ready to move in and prop up the oligarchic rule whenever it seemed threatened by middle class or APRA reformsits. In the hands of this oligarchic elite laid the vast majority of economic and political influence, centered in Lima. The Indians, migrant workers and lower class have traditionally had little political clout or influence.

APRA faced other structural realities in the thirties. In addition to APRA-military animosity after the Trujillo incident, relations with the church began to deteriorate. APRA's strong belief in separation between church and state made the church a powerful enemy. The "indegesmo" (concern for the traditions and culture of the native Indians) in APRA doctrine frightened many of the elites as they were violently opposed to any mention of involvement of the Indians in politics. Many elites feared that, "They (APRA) were in Peru as fully subversive an element as the Communist Party is today in the U.S.,"<sup>23</sup> according to historian Fredrick Pike. Pike went further to say, "Aprismo drove the traditional aristocracy as well as the church and military towards a more closed attitude."<sup>24</sup> Although Pike may have overstated the case, the point was clear. The oligarchy, military and church were all opposed to APRA and associated the party with violence and revolution. The fact that APRA was faced with these structural problems goes far in explaining a more moderate party platform later.

Historian Richard Lee Clinton described the confusing picture APRA presented in the early thirties:



APRA represented an eclectic amalgam of anti-imperialist, socialistic and nationalistic principles set in an uneven matrix of democracy, facism and the personal charisma of Haya de la Torre.<sup>25</sup>

APRA leaders recognized the difficulties within the Peruvian political scene and began to reform party structures in 1931 under Ramon Priale. The reorganization directed even more power and influence into the hands of Haya, emphasizing symbolism, emotional rallies and cult of the leader. The party expanded its organization in hopes of attracting more members through new social centers and Aprista-sponsored businesses, placement of an umbrella organization (Confederation de Trabajadores del Peru-CTP) over the unions of the northern sugar-workers and formalization of APRA's youth arm in the name of Federacion Aprista Juvenal (FAJ ), whose members swore total allegiance to APRA. On the lower levels, APRA grouped members into small party cells to carry out day to day activities of the party.<sup>26</sup>

Although these measures helped internal unity and expanded membership, it caused problems as well. There was growing criticism that APRA was an elitist organization and very closed to those outside the party. The iron grip of Haya de la Torre furthered this school of thought.

As of 1934, APRA "had all the appearances of a mass protest movement,"<sup>27</sup> according to one historian. This attitude of confrontation towards the oligarchy would continue through the years. In 1947. Haya expressed the violent nature of APRA:

Companions, today begins for the Apristas a new chapter in the history of their party. The pages will be

glory or shame. We<sup>28</sup> will write with  
blood or with mud.

The violence and confrontation of APRA continued as there were accusations of party involvement in a conspiracy to overthrow the government of Luis M. Sanchez Cerro in 1936 and Oscar R. Benevides in 1939. Top party officials again denied involvement in those uprisings, exposing the disagreement within the party over which method was most effective to reach power, violence of confrontation. The division was more apparent in the elections of 1939, from which APRA was banned. The APRA high-command preferred Jose Quesada, an independant conservative, while many Aprista rank and file favored Manuel Prado y Ugarteche, a more moderate candidate. APRA leaders realized the dissention within its ranks and finally called for its members to abstain. However, many Apristas defied the order and voted for Prado.<sup>29</sup>

The division within APRA was most apparent in 1948 during the presidency of Jose Luis Bustamante Rivero, who led a decentralized and democratic style government in which APRA enjoyed considerable congressional influence. As the APRA-Bustamante alliance began to crumble and there was danger of a right wing coup, Haya decided to prepare a fighting force. After much hesitation, he appointed Major Victor Villenueva to direct the effort. However, party leaders were not totally behind the effort as they denied essential funds to the movement, not able to decide whether to react violently or not to the crisis.<sup>30</sup> The word for the attack was finally given in October of 1948, but only parts of the force participated in the

insurrection, with the crucial division in Lima mounting a feeble attack. The coup attempt failed and over one thousand Apristas were arrested, causing further damage to the already tainted image of the party.

The reluctant rebellion attempt in 1948 represented an important trend which had been growing within the party since the late thirties, a trend of compromise with the oligarchy instead of resistance. A historic division within the party, the more moderate and non-violent methodology to reach power appeared to be winning out among party leaders.

#### 5. 1950s and Compromise

World War Two served to further develop a conservative and practical platform of APRA. Party philosophy became dramatically more moderate and less antagonistic towards the west and foreign capital. The reasons for this change were three-fold. Firstly, it appeared the horrors of Nazi totalitarianism and facism had a profound effect on how Haya and APRA viewed the world. Secondly, the party seemed more comfortable with the western model, particularly the administration of Franklin Roosevelt, which was more liberal concerning international affairs.<sup>31</sup> Finally, APRA's top leaders, particularly Haya, began to realise that their confrontational attitude may not have been the most effective method to gain power, that rebellion would not break through the structural realities of Peruvian power politics.

As far as specific changes, APRA doctrine began to emphasize the positive aspects of foreign capital and deleted the word

"yankee" from its doctrine when Haya presented the new "Aprista Maxim" in 1948. APRA softened its land-reform rhetoric and began to promote non-violent methods in pursuit of political goals, dropping the post of Secretary of Defense. APRA's anti-clerical stance was also softened as the party tried to present a more democratic image.<sup>32</sup>

To many Apristas, however, the movement towards cooperation with the oligarchy and a softening of APRA's anti-imperialism stance was difficult to correspond with the party roots of rebellion and a new social order. A large proportion of APRA faithful among the unions of the north and students in Lima (particularly at San Marcos University) were attracted to the party because it promised economic decentralization and changes in the political picture.

Understanding this important sector of APRA support and the tradition of original party doctrine, Haya presented his "historical-space time" theory in 1945. Based on the physics of Albert Einstein, Haya argued that history and forms of government were relative and while a certain form of government may be appropriate for a European country at one time, it may not work for a Latin American country at the same time.<sup>33</sup> Torre said Peru was at a stage in "historical-space time" where APRA could make certain concessions in policy and doctrine as a means for eventual realization of party goals. Haya criticized orthodox Marxists who said there were universal truths and revolution was the only method. The "historical-space time" theory gave Haya and APRA flexibility and maneuvering room without outwardly sacrificing original APRA doctrine.

However, the maturation of an APRA policy emphasizing moderation and concession was not without costs within APRA itself. The internal division, which had been apparent in 1934, 1939 and 1948, became more pronounced in the fifties. Many left-wing Apristas were uncomfortable with the new APRA-US friendship and opposition to violence. Haya was accused of losing touch with party rank and file, answering only to the APRA ruling cadre, the military, the oligarchy or to what Haya saw as a short-term political gains. The radical leaders of the thirties now appeared, "addicted to expensive food and drink, silk suits, comfortable homes and chauffeured limosines." <sup>34</sup> Haya was accused of being lazy, indecisive and senile at age fifty.

As the export-led economy of the post-war years boomed, it was likely that Haya decided to aim APRA policy more directly at the middle class. Historian Richard Lee Clinton described Haya's motives in the following words:

It is possible that Haya perceived a declining responsiveness within the middle class to radical solutions once the depression years were past and prosperity again seemed imminent. <sup>35</sup>

APRA also began courting young officers in the military hoping to soften the antipathy of the military against the party. In 1946 APRA supported the Sechura Contract, <sup>36</sup> which made land available to the International Petroleum Company, a subsidiary of Standard Oil and vivid symbol of foreign capital and influence. It was obvious APRA was moving rightward.

In 1956 APRA took a bold and dangerous political step as party leaders agreed to a partial coalition with Manuel Prado y

Ugarteche, exchanging with Prado APRA's political support for legalization of the party. Prado, an oligarchic conservative, had been a long-time enemy of APRA and differed dramatically in political methodology and ideology. The ruling cadre of APRA, however, believed that the "convivencia" (in Spanish, "living together") with Prado would accomplish two things. First, a Prado victory would hurt the newly formed Accion Popular, a moderate party under the leadership of the charismatic Fernando Belaunde Terry, which posed a great electoral threat to APRA's traditional foundations of support. Second, APRA would be legal if Prado gained power and they would not be denied access to political involvement like it had so many times prior. APRA hoped to dispel the myth of a party unable to rule, a party on the periphery of the political scene in Peru.

The "convivencia", however, furthered the rift within APRA, as could be expected. The left side of the party felt Haya had sacrificed basic APRA doctrine of democracy, empathy towards the middle and lower classes, anti-imperialism and anti-oligarchy, for short-term gains. Movements toward the military, the same military which has massacred thousands of Apristas only twenty-five years earlier, was unthinkable in the minds of many. There was a growing reputation among Apristas and non-Apristas alike that the party was corrupt and opportunistic and Haya de la Torre was weak and indecisive.

Within the party there were purges and defections. APRA-Rebelde, founded in 1956 in response to the "convivencia", engaged in guerrilla operations against the Prado government and main-line APRA party. During the 1959 APRA convention, eight

leaders were purged because they expressed opposition to the convivencia.<sup>37</sup>

As APRA moved rightward, the void on the left was filled by Belaunde and Accion Popular, Communists and other extreme groups. Between 1956 and 1962, 625 new unions were formed as former APRA labor faithful saw the party subordinating worker's rights for other party goals.<sup>38</sup> APRA lost student support as well. Through the following numbers one can see the decline of support for APRA:

1945-	APRA and Bustamente received	
	66% of the vote with APRA delivering	
	about 45%	
1956-	APRA received 50.4% of the total vote	
1956-	APRA received 27% of the vote	
	on its congressional lists	
1962/63-	APRA received less than 1/3 of vote	
1963 municipal-	APRA/UNO coalition	
	received 36,000 votes, less than	39
	the AP/DC alliance	

In the late fifties, APRA was considered a rightist party, having lost much of its youth and radicalism. One Lima analyst described APRA in this way:

APRA is dead. It will continue to go through the motions of a live party, but it is dead... and the main reason is this: who would want to join a party today that has two directions, two banners, two ideologies.<sup>40</sup>

The "two ideologies" were first, the original doctrine of APRA, which emphasized confrontation and a new social order. The second was the path of compromise taken by APRA taken in the fifties.

Although APRA saw the desertion of many party faithful, it made gains on the right. Prior to the 1962 elections, one

prominent rightist described Haya as, "the conservative leader this country needs."<sup>41</sup> APRA gained support among the influential upper class and upper middle class as well as gaining general political respect and legitimacy it never had.

In addition, APRA had key structures which continued to provide consistent electoral and political support despite the change in party direction. Most importantly was the strong organization and discipline. Also, the grass-roots structures were still in place and continued to recruit the youth of Peru. Two arms of APRA were strengthened in this period. The Chicos Apristas Peruanos (CHAP), composed of children two-ten years of age, and the Juventud Aprista Peruano (JAP), made up of children ten to eighteen, educated and promoted unquestioned authority to the party.<sup>42</sup> Apra still maintained strong ties with its laborers in the northern regions. The workers were lifetime Apristas where APRA was a strong cultural tradition. Finally, the strength and magnetism of Haya de la Torre remained a staff of strength for the APRA. Haya was worshipped by most Apristas and his authority rarely questioned. He represented APRA and determined most party policy. In many ways, he was APRA. His birthday was celebrated as an Aprista holiday and his name was exalted in APRA hymns.

It should be mentioned that the move to the right by APRA was not blind or metoeric. At certain times the party would participate in demonstrations or organize strikes. However, there was a definite movement right which can be seen when one looks objectively at the history of the party.



In the late fifties the economic boom was coming to an end and Prado began to find himself in economic and political hot water. Journalist Hector Bejar described the scene in 1957:

The situation could be compared to 1932, when a similar wave of discontent caused the formation of APRA and the Communist Party 43

This time, with APRA on the right, the discontent was channelled into the new left. From the late fifties to the mid-sixties there was a growth on the left which included APRA-Rebalde, Ejercito de Liberacion Nation (ELN) and Communist Students Trotskyests. Belaunde's Accion Popular (AP) also made impressive gains as it represented a more moderate position.<sup>44</sup>

The election of 1962, which Haya won, demonstrated that APRA still represented a major force in Peruvian politics. The party's grass roots organizations delivered 32.98 percent (557,047) of the vote.<sup>45</sup> This was not a majority and APRA was forced to make a coalition with Manuel A. Odria, a conservative and historic APRA enemy. Before the coalition could take power, however, the military moved in to take over, uncomfortable with either Haya or Odria in control.

The fall-out from the coalition with Odria and his party, Union Nacional Odriista (UNO) was severe for APRA. It further alienated the remainder of the radical left within the party as Apristas thought that a coalition with Odria was far too much to sacrifice for short-term political gains. Forty prominent Apristas signed an open letter to the press denouncing the coalition, accusing APRA leaders of foregoing concern for imperialism, elimination of an oppressive oligarchy and military

in exchange for selfish reasons.<sup>46</sup>

The Belaunde administration failed for a variety of reasons, one of which was a successful congressional bloc between APRA and UNO, as well as other economic and political problems. As in the past, the military moved in to assume control in 1968 as the left was far too weak and fractured to mount any resistance.

This concludes the first section of the paper. As the military-reformist government of Juan Velasco Alvarado took over in 1968, APRA was certainly in the more conservative sector of the Peruvian political spectrum. APRA began as a party which espoused social revolution and the destruction of the economic and political elite of Peru. However, the party became frustrated, particularly after World War Two, with its inability to gain any sort of legitimate foothold in Peruvian politics. Party leaders decided it was worth the sacrifice of some party radicalism and the desertion of some Aprista rank and file in order to place the party in a position where it might someday gain power. APRA spent the fifties, sixties and most of the seventies moving rightward at an uneven pace, ending up somewhere in the middle. The following quote was a good description of APRA in 1977:

APRA is the only party which can deliver votes. It controls many unions and remains powerful in a traditional stronghold, the sugar cooperatives of the northern coast. In the past the party has apparently come to an agreement with the military hierarchy which involves promises and a part in future elections in exchange for present peace and quiet. The government is much more concerned with trouble from the left than from the vague centre in which APRA

operates.<sup>47</sup>

## 6. Early Seventies: Growing Division and Political Isolation

APRA remained a powerful political force and the government of General Francisco Morales Bermudez depended on APRA support for its legitimacy in the late seventies. In 1975 APRA could count on the support of much of the army, almost the whole navy and growing support in the middle class.<sup>48</sup> APRA organized riots protesting military austerity measures and a lack of land reform. It was not surprising, therefore, that in May of 1976 Morales Bermudez made a speech calling for an end to the historic rivalry between APRA and the military. Morales Bermudez's speech demonstrated the continued support for APRA, even at a point in its history where it was considered weak. For example, in the 1931 elections APRA gained 76.44% of the vote in the north coast department of La Libertad. In 1963 it received 75.29% from the same region, reflecting the strong organization and historic strength of APRA.<sup>49</sup>

In the mid to late seventies, however, the problems within APRA were becoming more magnified. Between 1945 and 1963, APRA support had fallen from 45 to 34 percent of the electorate.<sup>50</sup> The party had not been able to attract or articulate the interests of the migrants flowing into Lima from the sierra as they were more attracted to the very clear reforms of Odria and Prado. Although it did have some success in Lima in 1945 and 1956, consistent support was not there.

Also, the new middle class, born out of the export-led economies of the fifties and sixties, did not automatically

support APRA. According to historian A.F. Van Niekerk, "these people (middle class) could no longer identify themselves with a pattern of political struggle in which APRA made the utmost of the antagonism between town and country."<sup>51</sup>

The most crippling and dangerous problem for APRA was the continuing underlying split within the party itself over ideological lines. As mentioned before, the rift had been seen as early as 1931, again in 1948 and was very apparent in 1956 with the "convivencia" with Prado. In the years 1977 until 1985 this rift became exposed as a number of events changed the course of APRA and the political scene in Peru.

From 1977, leading into the constitutional assembly elections in 1978, APRA still maintained its centrist position and continued to lose votes to the left as many Peruvians became alienated from the government of Morales Bermudez. The APRA controlled CTP did not encourage or support a nation-wide strike which had been called by the Communist labor union. It appeared that, "the military and the APRA have in the past year or so reached an unpublicized agreement to cooperate, especially on labor matters."<sup>52</sup>

The centrist APRA was vaguely associated with military policies by virtue of the fact that it did little to stand in the way of military directives.

In the May, 1978 constitutional assembly elections, APRA did well, gaining 35% of the vote. The growing PPC won 26% with a conservative platform. The most amazing effect of the elections, however, was the striking electoral gains by the left. Frente Obrero Campesino y Estudiante (FOCEP), the Trotskyist party,

Partido Unificado Mariateguista (PUM) and other leftist groups won a combined 28% of the vote, the first time the left had made a strong showing in Peru. In addition, the left filled an impressive 30 seats in the assembly, with APRA winning 37. In comparison, in the 1960's, an informal poll showed the communists with the support of only 6% of the electorate.<sup>53</sup>

At this point APRA was an enemy of the left, which could be seen through this analysis in a Peruvian periodical:

APRA has identified the left as its main target. Its reasoning goes that while there are similarities with the thinking of the right and centre parties, with the left there is no room for discussion. It (APRA) also sees itself as the last bulwark against a left wing force which according to APRA is prepared to "push Peru into an abyss."<sup>54</sup>

APRA maintained good relations with the government of Morales Bermudez and the APRA-PPC majority in the constitutional assembly opposed the general strike called in protest of a gasoline increase in January of 1979. Discussing decentralization, a policy favored by parties of the left and part of original APRA doctrine, a party official declared, "regional government (decentralization) would only open up the country to political demagoguery."<sup>55</sup> One could assume that "political demagoguery" was the left.

There was little doubt that APRA and the PPC were threatened by the electoral strength of the left and took the gains made by the left seriously. At the beginning of the constitutional assembly, over which Haya presided, there was an attempt, "to corral the left-wing delegates off into committee."<sup>56</sup> This effort

to isolate the left was representative of the political clout the left had.

In the summer of 1978, APRA decided that it would have to take this leftist movement more seriously. It began to reorganize the party in an attempt to strip away votes from the left.<sup>57</sup> The reorganization was directed by Armando Villenueva, a lifetime Aprista who rose through the military ranks of the party and represented a more confrontational and forceful side of APRA. He was an aggressive and directed politician who believed APRA should maintain a certain amount of its traditional roots.

The reorganization was not a wholesale one, but rather, a more concerted effort to play up to the left, especially the leader of FOCEP, Genaro Ledesma, in an attempt to neutralize their power.<sup>58</sup> Haya received some members of what he called the "responsible left" and ignored others whom he feared too radical. APRA certainly, "would now like to appear more to the left than it did during the campaign," (constitution assembly campaign) said one analyst.<sup>59</sup> APRA leaders realized the growing strength of the left as migrants in Lima, rural peasants and the middle class, who suffered from the depression of 1974-77, began to pour into the city. These groups had begun to look elsewhere for a political outlet as the Morales Bermudez government appeared corrupt and elitist.

## 7. 1978: The Illness of Haya

APRA itself maintained a certain amount of unity until the health of Haya de la Torre began to falter in the early months of

1979. Almost immediately there was a struggle over who would control the party, as Haya flew to Houston for medical treatment. The competition was among four main actors:

- Armando Villanueva- Controlled the day to day activities of the party. Considered an antagonist towards more moderate Apristas.
- Andres Townsend- The cosmopolitan member of the party and more moderate than Villanvera.
- Ramon Priale- Controlled party machinery and had influence over the grass-roots organizational arms of APRA. Moderate.
- Luis Alberto Sanchez- Stand-in for Haya and the party intellectual and "wise-man." Also moderate. 60

Perhaps the most important result of the reorganization was the rise of Armando Villanueva. Regardless of the reasons which led APRA to court the left, Villanueva's prestige and influence grew in the party. As all other major party leaders such as Priale, Sanchez and Townsend were occupied with the constitutional assembly, Villanvera took over much of the party apparatus and organization.<sup>61</sup>

In the first stages of Haya's illness it appeared that Luis Alberto Sanchez was in control. In April of 1979 he, Townsend and Priale went to visit President Morales Bermudez to discuss the current political situation. Villanueva was not among them. However, Haya was not sure himself who to pass on the leadership torch. In April of 1979 he called from the U.S. just before the Aprista convention and named a relatively unknown party official, Luis Alva Castro, to head the convention. This effectively blocked any attempt by party strongmen to consolidate their position through controlling the convention, or letting one faction or another assume power.<sup>62</sup> It was becoming more clear that the division within APRA saw Villanueva on one side and

Sanchez, Priale and Townsend on the other. The areas of dispute between the two sides were more complicated than a simple political power struggle.

Villanueva had many young followers, which included Luis Negreiros Criado, Alan Garcia, Javier Valle Riestra, Carlos Roca and Hugo Otero. From them we can gain some insight into Villanueva's ideas. Otero described APRA policy if Villanueva were to win the upcoming 1980 presidential election:

APRA policy will be a clear, democratic leftist program, a program whose goal is an anti-imperialist state, in other words, a republic of blue and white collar workers... We are prepared to confront and do battle with injustices, with abuses of the powerful and those who do not respect rights and are immoral. Shock troops for social democratic revolution.<sup>63</sup>

Although these words are not as radical as those of Haya in the late twenties and early thirties, Villanueva certainly represented a move to the left, a move back to APRA roots of anti-imperialism, morality and confrontation with forces which stood in the way of party goals. Villanueva also tried to open up APRA and dispel the reputation of a closed, elitist party through the following words, "Aprista membership cards will not be necessary in order to save Peru. Everyone will be called upon." He said he would, "stress solidarity with all peoples, classes and races which prevail in the world," renewing the old APRA tradition of Indoamerica.<sup>64</sup> Villanueva also supported a teachers' strike in early 1980, emphasizing his concern for labor.

On the other hand there was the more moderate side of Townsend, Priale and Sanchez. In an interview, Townsend was



asked to describe the "responsible left." He replied,

That is where there is a difference of opinion (between Villanueva and Townsend). I will not describe the responsible left because I have not met it. I said on television that I thought APRA was the responsible left. He (Villanueva) was asked once who the responsible left was and he said it was the Communist Party, the Christian Democratic Party and the PSR. I have my doubts about that.<sup>65</sup>

A main area of disagreement, then, was over not only who the responsible left included, but more importantly, where APRA fit into the picture. Villanueva saw APRA as a center party with viable parties on the left while Townsend saw APRA already on the left with only radical groups remaining.

Townsend, Sanchez and Priale were more conservative and shared a preference for compromise and concession with the ruling oligarchy and military to keep APRA legitimate. This was seen through a closer relationship with the Morales Bermudez government than Villanueva and simply through their statements of philosophy.

#### 8. 1979: The Death of Haya and Attempts at Party Unity

As already mentioned, the government of Morales Bermudez was quickly losing legitimacy and the left was making impressive gains leading up to the 1980 presidential election. APRA appeared strong moving towards the election, able to count on its traditional one-third of the vote and the possibility of stripping votes away from the radical left. However, on August 4th, 1979, Haya de la Torre died in Lima. This began a

year-long power struggle and severely tested party unity. In the days just before Haya's death, one could sense how dependant the party was on Haya for unity and direction. In April of 1979 Ramon Priale said, "Haya will preside over the 12th party congress and will be proclaimed the candidate for president." When he was very ill Alan García said, "doctors expect full recovery."<sup>66</sup> APRA leaders were afraid to admit that Haya was terminally ill because sucession was unclear.

So, when Haya died in August, it left a huge void and large shoes to fill. Almost immediately, Armando Villanueva and his aides (which included Alan García),

maneuvered into commanding position and his backers swept elections for the national-executive council. This was possible because Villanueva had been handling party affairs for the past eighteen months while other politicians were involved in the assembly campaign or later drafting the constitution.<sup>67</sup>

This move by Villanueva antagonized more moderate party members, especially Sanchez, Priale and Townsend, and furthered a growing perception that APRA was experiencing a major division, one which could have ended the party. Opponents within the party accused Villanueva and his aides, Luis Negreiros and Alan García, of using the CTP and other APRA organizations to establish control over the party. The internal division and subsequent conflicting messages emanating from different party sources gave the party an untrustworthy image. Both the left and the right, "have learned from experience that APRA can change its position from one moment to the next."<sup>68</sup>

At the party convention in mid-October of 1979, there was

anything but unity and consistency. Villanueva won the election as the party's presidential candidate by a margin of 641 to 435, a victory which was not the landslide he had been expecting,<sup>69</sup> and demonstrated the division within the party. There were accusations of cheating and fraud as disciplinary measures were brought against a half-dozen Townsend backers. Both sides, "arrived with chains, knives and pistols."<sup>70</sup> In an attempt to foster unity, Andres Townsend was nominated as the vice-presidential candidate. This option was supported by 100% of the convention, but Townsend said he would not run for an office on the same ticket as Villanueva.<sup>71</sup> After a three-day negotiation period, however, Townsend agreed to a compromise which would include an APRA leadership team of Villanueva, Townsend, Sanchez and Priale. In an attempt to convince doubters, Townsend said, "basically we (he and Villanueva) follow the same party line."<sup>72</sup>

The next nine months were spent preparing for the presidential elections in May of 1980. When reviewing official APRA policy at the time, it is evident that Villanueva was in control of the platform and had moved it somewhat to the left in search of capitalizing on the new voter pool there. One political analyst viewed APRA in the following way:

Villanueva has given a left-wing tilt to his campaign by picking up some of the demands and slogans associated with the radical left like the reinstatement of sacked miners and state school teachers.<sup>73</sup>

Villanueva was also in favor of reducing the tax rebate for exported manufactured goods, decentralization, money for youth

and poor projects. Villanueva expanded on his ideas about government spending:

We believe an error has been committed with a tendency towards large public works. We are going to intensify small irrigation projects, fundamental services using internal technologies.<sup>74</sup>

Villanueva also promoted "mixed foreign" involvement, which emphasized limiting foreign investment according to what Peru needed. The leftward swing was clear as Villanueva stressed many of the same things that APRA laid its foundation upon - emphasis on projects for the poor, against large government monopolies and decentralization of the government. In addition, the way Villanueva handled the Townsend dispute and party divisions showed that he was in control. Many thought Villanueva, a charismatic politician, could lead the party to victory.

Leading up to the 1980 election APRA had a tough opponent on the right, the PPC which, "had emerged as an authentic conservative party," and in the centre, AP, which, "occupies the center, but without the left-wing appeal that won Belaunde the presidency in 1963."<sup>75</sup> APRA hoped they could gain their traditional one-third from the middle class and dislodge the new left for victory. As of January 1980, the race was a close one, with AP polling 23% of the nation's electorate and APRA 22%. The left polled only 13% and it seemed to be weakening after its impressive gains in the 1978 constitutional assembly elections.<sup>76</sup> This was due in a large part to the fractured nature of the left, with over seven parties splitting the vote.

The results of the election demonstrated that the precarious unity within APRA was not enough to generate the electoral

support needed for a victory. Belaunde and AP came away with a clear victory as can be seen through the election results:

AP (Belaunde).....	1,870,964	=	45.4%	
APRA (Villanueva)...	1,129,971	=	27.4%	
PPC (Bedaya).....	394,592	=	9.6%	
Left Parties.....	652,876	=	15.8%	77

APRA won a majority in Trujillo and other party strongholds, but AP won everything else. Belaunde was, "able to get the great mass of voters who had no strong allegiance to a party,"<sup>78</sup> mainly found on the left. Belaunde was more experienced politically, with more stature, which the Peruvian electorate desired after twelve years of military rule. It was a strong anti-military vote. One analyst described APRA's failure in the following way:

Villanueva was unable to attract left-wing votes as was laid out in the original campaign strategy. Nor was he able to get votes when he switched his campaign emphasis weeks before the election in a desperate attempt to keep from falling behind Belaunde.<sup>79</sup>

The internal division within APRA did affect the results as "Belaunde probably owed his wide margin of victory to the votes of a number of disaffected Aprista," a Lima weekly stated. "The tensions within the organization hampered APRA's ability to compete successfully with the left for support from new voters outside the traditional APRA strongholds of the north."<sup>80</sup>

After the disappointing results in the May elections, the problems with APRA became worse as the party searched for a scapegoat. Villanueva, a likely candidate, tried to blame the AP as he accused them of vote fraud just after the election. There

was an open dispute within the CTP between the old guard and younger members, mirroring the situation within APRA. Julio Cruzado, a sixteen year CTP general-secretary and APRA senator, was in a power struggle with Luis Negreiros, a young Aprista backed by Villanueva. Because of his experience and bureaucratic control, Cruzado won, but the internal conflict demonstrated the degree of division throughout all party structures.<sup>81</sup>

Criticism at Villanueva, which had been heard since his rise to power, were becoming more regular. He was accused of not representing the whole of APRA and denying membership to qualified APRA candidates. His wife was Chilean (Chile was and is a long-time enemy of Peru) and not popular among Apristas, particularly women.<sup>82</sup> Most importantly, many of the leaders on the right side of the party spectrum feared that Villanueva was taking the party too far left which, it important credibility.

#### 9. 1980: Party Split and the Rise of Alan Garcia

The division came to a violent climax during the party congress in August of 1980, exactly one year after the death of Haya de la Torre. The party split into two factions as Sanchez, Priale and Townsend walked out, complaining that Villanueva was recruiting members who had no credentials, denying membership to long-time Apristas.<sup>83</sup> There were also criticisms that party policies were becoming too activist and confrontational, that Villanueva was ignoring a large sector of the rank and file Apristas.<sup>84</sup> A particularly bitter area of dispute was whether or not APRA should accept a coalition proposal by the Belaunde

government. After the election, Villanueva said, "We will remain absolutely independant."<sup>85</sup> However, many Apristas thought a coalition was a smart political move, providing APRA some political clout. Villanueva again rejected the proposal, leading to more animosity and violence. Luis Alberto Sanchez was attacked and beaten.<sup>86</sup> However, Villanueva and newly-elected general-secretary Fernando Leon de Vivero managed to woo back Priale and Sanchez, stressing unity and the need to prepare for the upcoming municipal elections. Townsend was viewed as too difficult to deal with and found himself more and more on the fringes of main-line APRA leadership.

As a result of the continuing friction within the party, it took party veterans a month longer than any other party to agree on a mayoral candidate. The compromise candidate was Justo Enrique Debarbier, a low-risk politician who, according to one political analyst, "will not attract the votes from non-Apristas which are needed to reverse APRA's poor showing in the general election."<sup>87</sup> The political liability of Debarbier demonstrated how the division within APRA weakened party decisions and success. It was said the party was, "more concerned with its internal disputes than with congressional work."<sup>88</sup>

APRA was faced with very real leadership and image problems, which were reflected in the results from the municipal elections in November of 1980. APRA did poorly, losing in most every sector of the country as AP won most races. Izquierda Unida (IU, a leftist coalition made up of four parties and two multi-party fronts. Grouped all the forces of the left except the Trotskyists, Sendero Luminoso and other groups engaged in armed

struggle.) also had a solid showing, taking 49% in Arequipa and making gains in Lima as well.<sup>89</sup>

After the poor showing in the municipal elections, Andres Townsend, who had come to represent the militant right side of the party, was expelled in January of 1981 as Villanueva tried to hang on to his crumbling leadership. The Townsend expulsion had been building for some months as he had, "openly defied the authority of the party's national executive, charging that it was a result of a fraudulent party congress."<sup>90</sup> Townsend accused the executive council of being filled with communists and Trotskyites. He had also broken with the tradition of settling disputes in private within the party, a method which had helped maintain party unity for years.

The purges within the party continued as Townsend backers Judith Prieto de Zegarra and Horatio Lago were cited for disciplinary reasons. Once again the division turned into violence as party general-secretary Fernando de Vivero was shot, and backers for both sides came to the party headquarters in Trujillo armed. In March of 1981 there were two separate celebrations honoring the birth of Haya, one with the backers of Villanueva, which was the larger one, and another sponsored by Townsend.<sup>91</sup>

The rift was also reflected in the Congress. The role of APRA in the Belaunde congress was summed up in the following words:

In the senate, the AP-PPC majority  
can count on the easy-going opposition  
of APRA vets like Luis Alberto Sanchez,



while in the lower house APRA tends to be more tenacious in its politicking- which also indicates the degree which APRA lacks overall leadership in policy decisions.<sup>92</sup>

#### 10. 1981: Attempts at Party Reorganization

APRA was at low ebb in the early eighties. At the municipal elections APRA had been overtaken not only by IU, but by AP as well. It had the support of neither the right or left and leadership problems were acute.

There were attempts to promote unity through the first part of 1981. In April, Alan Garcia was named to chair the APRA Reorganization Committee. Ramon Priale, who was an APRA moderate, gave support to the young aide of Villanueva. "It is logical for me to express my hope that all APRA members understand and support Alan and the members of the committee", he said.<sup>93</sup> In June of 1981 amnesty was given to all expelled members of APRA in hopes of forging new unity.<sup>94</sup>

Certain changes were taking place with the party at this time, which foreshadowed the fall of Villanueva and rise of Alan Garcia. The "opening up" of the party continued as it had begun with the rise of Villanueva. Party organs were not as closed and positions granted more on credentials than patronage. Aprista rank and file were more involved in decisions and subsequently, younger Apristas were rising more quickly after the death of Haya and the democratization of the party.

Party leadership was changing as well. Villanueva was replaced as general secretary by Fernando Leon de Vivero and Garcia began to influence policy more through his post as chairman

of the Reorganization Committee.

Villanueva still had some control of the party, though, mainly through his influence over party machinery, but a significant portion of Aprista rank and file were supporting the candidacy of Townsend or were undecided as the country began to prepare for the 1985 presidential elections. In a June, 1982 poll, one could see the changes taking place within the party. When asked, "Who do you think will win the presidency in 1985," the figures received for the APRA candidates (other candidates polled the remainder, which is not shown) were as follows:

Villanueva...	10.8%
Townsend.....	6.3%
Garcia.....	1.3%

Villanueva was losing support to Townsend and even to Garcia, who attracted the interest of many young Apristas.

On the party level, the same question was asked with the following results:

APRA.....	20.5%	
AP.....	16.6%	
Left.....	15.5%	
Undecided/Others...	36.1%	95

Although APRA was still the most popular party in Peru, it saw a drop of 7.5% from the percentage held during the 1980 presidential election. This was surprising considering that the AP dropped 16.6% from the 1980 election and the left remained at about the same level.<sup>96</sup> The poll reflects two things. First, a disappointment with the Belaunde government and second, a huge proportion of undecided voters. APRA, as usual, received its one-quarter to one-third of the percentage, but was still having trouble attracting non-Aprista voters. This was due to the

fractured nature of the party leadership and the declining influence of Armando Villanueva.

The rise of Alan Garcia to leadership was spectacular and meteoric. A lifetime Aprista, Garcia first appeared in the upper level at party leadership during the last days of Haya de la Torre as an aid to Villanueva. Villanueva and Garcia had a father-son type of relationship and shared many of the same political views and perceptions of APRA goals. Garcia emphasized turning back to the roots of the party, stressing decentralization, concern for the poor, promotion of the domestic production and a degree of skepticism towards the west. Garcia had made trips to North Korea and Nicaragua, sympathizing with their causes. He represented a young and aggressive faction of APRA, not afraid to fight or take a stand. However, Garcia was not as antagonistic towards fellow Apristas as Villanueva and at the beginning of his campaign for president was more centrist in policies, as we shall see more clearly closer to the election.

Garcia was in the background of APRA affairs from his emergence as an adviser to Villanueva in 1977 until 1982. He stayed within the system, but took advantage of the new democratization within the party and moved up quickly. He held such key posts as Chairman of the National Ideological Committee and Reorganization Committee. The break for Garcia came after the embarrassing losses in the 1980 elections and the rip within the party in late 1980 and all of 1981. Villanueva and the party had lost much prestige and Villanueva was the scapegoat for the failure at the party.

In November of 1982, Alan Garcia was elected as party general-secretary, replacing Leon de Vivero, who had held that post 1981. Vivero and Villanueva were dropped to positions on the National Executive Committee, headed by party old-timer Luis Alberto Sanchez. Garcia won an overwhelming victory among Aprista rank and file, seemingly bridging the two factions and emerging as a true compromise candidate. Garcia did compromise with the moderates within the party by forcing party militant and old friend, Villanueva, to drop to a position lower than Sanchez.<sup>97</sup> Garcia, who had been in a quiet battle with Villanueva for control of the left wing of the party for some time, realized that to have control of the entire APRA rank and file, he must incorporate Sanchez and the moderates. Villanueva, who had lost much support in the party since 1980, was more of a political handicap for Garcia than anything else.

Garcia also gave the National Executive Committee added policy-making power, which meant Garcia would have to share power with Sanchez, head of that committee. For much of 1982 and 1983 Garcia consolidated his leadership within APRA and prepared for the municipal elections of 1983.<sup>98</sup>

#### 11. 1983: Municipal Victories and Growing Popularity

In the summer of 1983, Garcia was busy pointing out the failures of the Belaunde administration. After a prosperous beginning, the Belaunde government was falling on difficult times. The economy was in a nosedive with low exports, inflation and spiraling foreign debt. There were floods in the north and a drug trade spurred on by hard economic times. Key industries of

fishing, mining and agriculture all suffered.<sup>99</sup> Even the government admitted it, predicting, "massive bankruptcies this year (1983) in industry and commerce."<sup>100</sup>

In April of 1983 Garcia unleashed against the Belaunde administration in order to rally the country around APRA:

An evaluation of the two and one-half years of the government reveals most of its promises broken and a more critical situation than existed at the beginning of its mandate... foreign debt has not declined but has been abused... Production has not revitalized... The million jobs announced have not been generated... centralism persists... The foreign policy is not independent but rather one of rigid alignment with the U.S.... Housing is not more accessible now to the people but has become scarce and expensive... The health and education of Peruvians has seriously declined... The real wages of workers have decreased instead of increased.

Benefits must be granted to favor the priority economic sectors and the neediest social classes -- the bulk of the population.<sup>101</sup>

One could see exactly where Garcia placed his emphasis. After presenting the list of criticisms, he continued to outline the ten most urgent APRA demands. Included in those were the following:

- Absolute priority to the revitalization of the national productive system.
- Revision and curb on debt policy.
- Clear definition of policy to support the working class.
- Decisive support to decentralization.
- Reorientation of foreign policy.<sup>102</sup>

This was just a skeletal framework from which Garcia would later expand, but it did serve to give APRA policy direction and

showed APRA rank and file that Garcia had specific reform ideas.

The basic policies of Garcia are similar to those of Villanueva although the execution of the changes were different. Garcia was more moderate than Villanueva and able to articulate a wider range of Aprista rank and file goals. He toned down the rhetoric of Villanueva and was more diplomatic and politically smooth in presentation than Villanueva. Many times Villanueva took a far too radical stand. He once praised Cuba's Fidel Castro as, "a great leader and patriot of Latin America."<sup>103</sup> This led one to believe that Villanueva favored a more radical path to reach party goals. Garcia, on the other hand, "is a moderate man, with a democratic and anti-totalitarian ideology," according to one source.<sup>104</sup>

Garcia's policies were more palatable to the majority of Apristas, demonstrated by his 94 percent victory in the election for party secretary.

The new orientation of APRA, combined with the continued failure of the Belaunde administration and deterioration of the Peruvian economy, served to give APRA some impressive victories in 1983 municipal elections. The results at the national level were as follows:

APRA...34%	
IU...30%	
AP...15%	105

APRA won seventy-one of the 155 provincial councils and 13 of the 23 departmental capitals. It still had difficulty attracting votes in Lima as IU, under the strong leadership of Alfonso Barrantes, won the first democratically-elected marxist

mayor in a South American capitol.<sup>106</sup> Lima-Callao would be a crucial voting arena for APRA in the 1985 election as one-third of the 7.5 million Peruvian electorate was located there.

After the solid victory, Garcia spoke strongly of APRA independence and his role in the party. He declared:

APRA, a party with old political traditions, is not dazzled by the victory of other parties. (IU victories) Moreover, while Alan Garcia is APRA secretary-general, and since a new party congress is not planned, APRA will comply with the resolutions of its last congress. It will continue to maintain its identity and will not join a popular front with either the Marxist-Leninist, Communist sector, or an unpopular front with rightist parties.<sup>107</sup>

## 12. 1984-5: Preparation for the 1985 Elections

With the secure electoral victory behind him, Garcia began to make plans for the upcoming presidential bid in 1985. The main thrust of APRA during 1983 and 84 was an effort to attract the huge undecided voter pool on the left, which was growing even larger. The failure of the Belaunde government and the new-found APRA popularity were due in a large part to the inefficiency of the Peruvian economy. Strikes which spilled over into battles in the streets, the GNP declined 12% in 1983 and grew only 1/2 of a percent in 1984, per capita income had dropped 25% since 1980 and unemployment had risen dramatically. Inflation was running at about 120% with huge government budget deficits. Peru, as of January 1985, was \$160 million dollars in arrears in foreign debt payments. Corruption among government officials was rampant, terrorism had increased, as had drug traffic.<sup>108</sup> Many compared the

economic and political situation in Peru to the depression of 1879 (a result of the war of the Pacific), or the depression in the 1930's. These severe structural problems within the Peruvian system had much to do with the growth of the left and the eventual emergence of a strong APRA under Garcia.

The primary method employed by APRA in preparation for the presidential elections was an effort to change the party image of a closed, secretarian and violent party to a more broad-based one, open to all Peruvians. Luis Alva Castro, APRA's second vice-presidential candidate, stated that the party would favor cuts in defense spending and slowing investment in giant public works projects.<sup>109</sup> Another change proposed by Castro, as outlined in the Peru Plan (presented in July of 1984) was the attempt to open up the party to non-members. This was to be accomplished through out-of-party organizations called "Civic Communities to Support the Candidacy of Alan Garcia."<sup>110</sup> They were aimed at those citizens who felt more comfortable as political independents, not attached to any one party. Another method to open the party was an effort to create a "national consensus" involving the political cooperation of other political and social forces, such as the church and the armed forces. "We are very conscious we are not the whole country,"<sup>111</sup> said Castro in a revealing quote.

APRA also began to emphasize a more technical capability in an effort to dispell the reputation of unprofessional and naive leadership.<sup>112</sup> The party was aware that it had to start providing non-ideological and non-dogmatic solutions to its own organizational problems and the problems of Peru. The main reason, however, in the decision to incorporate non-Apristas into



the government appeared to be, "the lack of depth and staffing", or limited experience and management skills of many Apristas.<sup>113</sup> Many governments had done this in the past, including Belaunde and Velasco. APRA's desire for such a move, however, was more acute as one reviews the party history. Banned for more than half of its existence and faced with repression for the majority of time, the only executive experience for APRA was a few ministries in 1945-48 under Morales Bermudez. The repression and rightward swing experienced by APRA prolonged the rule of Haya de la Torre, and younger leaders did not have the chance to become involved or tested as legislators or leaders.

"Intellectuals never joined and it is a party of politicians rather than technical experts," said one Peruvian analyst.<sup>114</sup> APRA needed the expertise and skill of non-party members to form a modern government policy. One analyst remarked, "It (APRA) has had an unfashionable lower middle class, provincial image."<sup>115</sup> This is what APRA wanted and needed to change. The APRA Government Plan Office, responsible for recruitment of Apristas and non-Apristas for the new regime, predicted that, "perhaps 30 percent" of the 600 registered professionals at the office were not Apristas.<sup>116</sup>

Nevertheless, in preparing for the electoral program there still seemed to be disagreement among APRA officials, resulting in few specifics on policy. Luis Alberto Sanchez explained the process of policy formation in the following words:

On some points we have clear ideas  
and we can say what they are; there  
are other points on which we have  
clear ideas but we're not going to

say them yet; and on other points we don't have clear ideas, but we're going to have them.<sup>117</sup>

The area of disagreement were many, but a clear example concerned military expenditures. When discussing the planned Chimbote naval base (at a cost of one billion U.S. dollars), Sanchez said, "it is a good project which would save money on repairs to the fleet." In addition he said, "It is inevitable that defense spending will increase." According to Castro, however, "economic realism" dictated "postponing" starting on the base.<sup>118</sup> The military, although much closer to APRA since the tenure of Morales Bermudez, remained, according to some APRA members, "very mistrustful" of the party while other Apristas found the military leadership open and approachable. This reflected the continued dual reputation of APRA despite the strong leadership of Garcia.

APRA promised a strong stand against government corruption, particularly in the police force, an effort to infiltrate the drug racket and terrorist operations through military means and attempts to improve economic and civilian institutions in the south of Peru, where many of the problems originated.

APRA economic policy, the most critical area for attention, was not well defined in mid-1983. APRA was committed to shoring up weak industries such as agriculture, fishing and mining. APRA hoped to put a greater emphasis upon planning and would abolish state monopolies on undevelopped mineral concessions and sell off existing state companies that had nothing to do with the state, like cinemas and bottling companies. APRA planned to further protect domestic industries through trade barriers and

incentives, increase wages which would boost disposable income of consumers, hopefully giving the economy a needed influx of domestic capital.<sup>119</sup>

Although these ideas were considered reformist and liberal to many observers, the policies were careful not to step on the toes of the wealthy and powerful of Peru. According to government officials, there would not be a nationalization of private banks or foreign-owned oil companies, and there would be an effort to seek a pact with private industry which would guarantee companies access to foreign exchange and credit.<sup>120</sup>

There was some discussion, although not specific, concerning tariffs to protect local manufacturers and to impose complete exchange controls, as well as a major devaluation of the sol, the Peruvian currency. Concerning foreign debt, the party sought a global refinancing of all maturities on a fifteen to twenty-year basis and limitation of total debt service to 20% to 25% of export earnings. Foreign policy would move away from dependence on the U.S. to a more neutral position.<sup>121</sup>

These reforms presented by Garcia and Castro were not dissimilar from those presented by Villanueva when he ran for president in 1980. They both shared the same concern for domestic producers, a desire to limit the economic centralism of Peru, limitation of foreign investment, nationalism and an opening up of the party for all Peruvians.

However, with Alan Garcia at the helm, the presentation of party platform to both Apristas and non-Apristas was more successful. Garcia took office and provided more directed and

moderate leadership, toning down his rhetoric so as to not alienate fellow Apristas. His style of leadership was very charismatic and, "he struck a number of responsive themes," according to Foreign Affairs.<sup>122</sup> Garcia emerged as an "image of protest and hope" to Peruvians, campaigning everywhere, holding meetings in small cities and visiting rural areas throughout Peru. His campaign slogan was, "Only Alan can Save Peru."<sup>123</sup> He seized the imagination of the Peruvian people, capitalizing on the national crisis of confidence among his countrymen. His strong stance against foreign debt placed Peru in the forefront of international politics.

Garcia successfully rallied the nation around him through such issues as nationalism and reform:

We require a nationalistic state to defend the Nation from the monopolistic structure of some enterprises whose dominant position in the market allows for excessive profits... In the name of a populist State, in the name of a State which I have no hesitation calling revolutionary... On the international level we revindicate the basic intergrationist essence of Haya de la Torre as an instrument of defense or other nations against imperialist hegemony.<sup>124</sup>

Garcia called the nation to come together and be united. "My commitment is to all Peruvians," he often said.<sup>125</sup>

Garcia was elected as the APRA candidate for president in 1984, receiving 94% of the Aprista rank and file vote. Clearly, Garcia had healed, if only temporarily, the division within the party, representing a compromise between the two viewpoints on party policy. No party member could deny the massive non-Aprista

following and the charisma which made Alan such a powerful leader.

The sometimes pluralism and concessionary nature of the Garcia government was also represented in the selection of members to his cabinet. Luis Alberto Sanchez was elected APRA's vice-presidential candidate in May of 1984, but he was joined on the cabinet by Villanueva and other more militant Apristas. Sanchez was a sworn enemy of the probable economic minister, Manuel Moreya.<sup>126</sup> The diverse nature of Garcia's cabinet is an example of the strong and democratic nature of his leadership. One Aprista remarked in 1984, "There are not now marked opposing factions within APRA. The great masses are institutionalist and support Garcia because he has revitalized the party and is leading it to certain victory."<sup>127</sup>

One major area of emphasis for Garcia was to increase APRA influence in the south of Peru, traditionally a weak area for the party. For example, in 1931, the party lost to Sanchez Cerro in the south by 11,964 votes to APRA's 3,965. In all subsequent elections, including 1980 and 83, APRA never finished higher than second.<sup>128</sup> However, as a result of Garcia's southern campaign strategy and the resurgence of the party generally, there seemed to be an increase in APRA popularity. In a poll of August, 1984, APRA polled 48.4% of the vote in the south, followed by IU at 17.6%, AP at 10.3% and the PPC at 5.3%.<sup>129</sup> The popularity of Garcia and the decline of AP influence led to substantial gains for APRA in the region. Garcia was beginning to represent all of Peru. In a rally in Arequipa, the APRA symbol was simple - a large picture of Haya de la Torre with the words, "Alan - Peru"

next to it.<sup>130</sup> APRA was reviving the revolutionary spirit of Haya through Alan Garcia.

During the campaign, Garcia also met with military and church leaders, trying to soften the animosity between those two groups and APRA. Garcia was careful not to blatantly criticize the still powerful military, but he did emphasize that, "the armed forces should recognize its constitutional limitations."<sup>131</sup>

As the election of April, 1985 neared, Garcia began to increase his attacks upon the Belaunde administration and reaffirmed his commitment to make profound changes within Peru. Garcia's tone became more rebellious and angry as he sought to build up the fervor and support of the Peruvians.

He attacked the worsening economic performance of Belaunde, which included \$14 billion dollars in debt, late payment on the interest on the debt, inability to find new capital, GNP below 1965 levels and unemployment/underemployment estimated at 65%.<sup>132</sup> He also unleashed a harsh attack on the U.S. in early 1985:

I believe the Ronald Reagan administration is a revival of the most hard-line Republicanism. The increase in interest rates, the pejorative treatment of Latin America, the reference to Central America as a backyard and that absurd bipolar idea that every problem in Latin America is solely the Soviets work are grave diplomatic errors.<sup>133</sup>

Garcia stressed Peruvian nationalism and a confrontational attitude toward any force, either domestic or international, which stood in the way of the progress of Peru.

He also depended heavily on the myth, charisma and tradition of Haya to increase the enthusiasm and commitment of the

Peruvians:

I invoke with the name of God  
the spirit of Haya de la Torre  
to light our path and give us  
strength. I must say that his  
life and his example are present  
here and that his proposals added  
to those men of good faith in  
this land the insignia of a  
government for all, but especially  
for the poorest and those who suffer  
most in Peru.<sup>134</sup>

### 13. 1985: Election Victory Initial Reform Measures

The election results of April 14, 1985 proved to be a landslide victory for Alan Garcia and APRA. The results are below:

Garcia (APRA).....	3,629,758	(48%)	
Barrantes (UL).....	1,780,560	(23.5%)	
Bedoya (PPC).....	922,560	(12.2%)	
Alva (AP).....	378,752	(5%)	135

As predicted, APRA had successfully attracted the huge undecided vote, at one point believed to be 30% of the electorate. There was a sharp fall in the blank and disqualified voters (cut in half from the 1980 election) which APRA was able to reach.<sup>136</sup> Both Garcia and the UL candidate, Barrantes, were successful in mobilizing the workers, urban dwellers, peasants and Indians, offering them a ray of hope and avenue of escape from economic turmoil. The middle class, who feared a leftist victory, voted for Alan. The saturation campaign by APRA, with a heavy use of television, radio and magazines during the last two weeks of the campaign, portrayed an organized and well-run party, in contrast to the, "cacophonic score of names, symbols and numbers from other parties."<sup>137</sup> This was a new tactic for APRA,

which had traditionally used huge rallies in Trujillo as their form of advertisement. Garcia wanted the party to become more modern and reach more people, which it did. One analyst observed the following:

Garcia's success was the consistent level of support he achieved across the whole country, which brought him victory in traditional non-Aprista areas. (like Lima-Callao, shanty-towns, Casco and Puno.)<sup>138</sup>

One of the major factors in APRA success was the complete collapse of AP, polling only 5% nationwide. This left no party in the center. APRA filled this void and attracted votes from both the right and left to walk away with the election. To demonstrate the magnitude of the Garcia victory, he received 3,629,758, or 48% of the electorate in 1985. In 1980, the victorious Belaunde got 1,870,864 or 28.4% to ensure his victory.<sup>139</sup> In addition, APRA won a clear majority in congressional races, ensuring easy passage of reforms.

Many would argue, however, that the most difficult challenge for APRA and Garcia was not the electoral campaign and victory, as that was made possible by the sharp demise of the AP, but rather, the upcoming challenge of governing a country with the economic, political and social problems of Peru.

In the first days after his victory, before inauguration or assuming official control of the government, Garcia solidified his position as the unquestioned leader of APRA. He positioned himself at the center of a web of advisory committees, which would in turn limit the decision-making power of his individual ministers.<sup>140</sup> Garcia was also taking firm control of the economy,



not passing on all the responsibility to his chief economic aide, Manuel Moreyra. Garcia was busy meeting with church, academic and military leaders in hopes of assuaging any doubts or fears they may have had about the new administration.

Garcia made statements in June of 1985 about his continued commitment to a change in consumption patterns of Peruvians, aid to labor, small development projects in agriculture and in the poor sectors of the economy, decentralization and the immediate reform of the military, and police forces to help fight growing terrorism and drug traffic. At this point, however, Garcia was still speaking in general terms, not carrying through specific reforms.<sup>141</sup>

In July of 1985, Garcia and his Prime Minister Luis Alva Castro gave further details of his policies in Garcia's Inaugural Address. In Alva Castro's address, he included the following economic measures:

- 12% devaluation, followed by a freeze in the exchange rate.
- Reduction of effective interest rates for loans from 280% or more to 110% with further reductions to follow.
- Wage increases, 50% in minimum wage, 22% for teachers and 15% for civil servants.
- General price freeze.
- Price increase in gas and other government products to avoid increasing fiscal debt.
- Freezing dollar accounts, and dollar-denominated certificates of deposit.<sup>142</sup>

While Alva Castro's presentation emphasized the economy, Garcia's was more broad in scope. It can be divided into various sectors: A "moralization campaign," which would see tougher prison sentence for government officials involved in fraud. Reorganization and clean-up of the police forces, federal

bureaucracy and other state institutions. In agriculture, emphasizing import-substitution potential and ending unfair competition by foreign goods. Garcia favored an end to tax incentives for oil companies and a reorientation of the fisheries from fishmeal production to frozen fish. He promised a strong effort to fight terrorism in the south through military aid as well as economic programs to solve some of the structural problems which led to terrorism. Also, a thrust to limit the drug trade. Finally, he expanded on the economic measures presented by Alva Castro, including harsh measures against inflation, reiteration of his determination to limit debt payments and a strong anti-imperialist stance with the foundation of Indo-America.<sup>143</sup>

Although the speech was drastic and offered a clear vision of hope for all Peruvians, it lacked specifics on implementation and execution, particularly in the non-economic sections. Garcia depended on such words as: reassertion, committee, intention and request.

In addition, Garcia used many references to Haya de la Torre and other broad, ideological themes as solutions to the problems of Peru:

He(Haya) took up the reformist message of the Argentine youth in 1918, the revolutionary echoes of Mexico, the inspiration of the American Union of Bolivar and the voice of our oppressed race...People of Peru, I talk to you also in the name of the old heroes and the vast multitudes and I speak, too, in the name of he who is not here but who showed me the way. We will arrive I tell you children, at the promised land, to the conquest of our own bread and our freedom... I want a government for which power is not abuse and pride, nor profiteering or booty.<sup>144</sup>

Granted, a certain degree of lofty rhetoric was expected in the inaugural speech, especially since Garcia had been elected as a result of such promises and a revindication of the traditions of APRA and the promises of Haya de la Torre. However, the speech seemed to emphasize cosmetic and vague solutions to Peru's problems. Garcia stressed the nationalism of Peru, pledging to pay only 10% of its foreign exchange for loans. Garcia reasserted the idea of Latin American unity, which can be seen through this statement he addressed to leaders of other Latin nations:

Let's unite, brothers, to be loyal to our peoples and in this way we will have brought the future to the present and laid the bases in our peoples of an authentic, profound and lasting social justice.<sup>145</sup>

These words and ideals gave the Peruvians a sense of purpose and revolution, a way out of their desperate plight. APRA had become a true populist party as it succeeded in attracting followers from all sectors of society.

Many Peruvians, however, were frightened that Garcia was taking the country too far left in the first weeks of his administration. Particularly in foreign relations and foreign debt, Garcia sounded more revolutionary than many thought he would. He certainly made Peru one of the most defiant of Latin American debtors, taking a confrontational stance against the U.S. concerning debt and politics. On debt, Garcia stated in February of 1986 that, "We will pay our debts when Peru wants to and when it can."<sup>148</sup>

With Peru's total foreign debt over \$14 billion dollars and real wages dropped by 50%, Garcia took a strong stand about debt

repayment:

In 1986 we would have to pay nearly \$6 billion on our debt while the total value of our exports hardly exceeds \$3 billion...We say that the Peruvian national salary, which is the product of its exports, cannot be impounded...I tell you, we will not be cut in pieces or sold as slaves.<sup>147</sup>

On Nicaragua, Garcia, without specifically naming the U.S., said:

...An act of hostility and intervention in Nicaragua will be an act of hostility and intervention against all of Latin America..... if foreign forces (U.S.) invade Nicaragua, Peru will break relations with the aggressive power and make every effort to defend the brother country.<sup>148</sup>

Also, in December of 1985, the Garcia administration seized the assets of two U.S.-based oil companies, sparking fears that a wave of expropriations may follow. Garcia suspended their contracts and demanded renegotiations within 90 days, charging the companies had not properly reinvested profits obtained from tax breaks. Garcia explained the move in the following words:

To be nationalist does not mean to expel everything of foreign investment from Peru... We believe that foreign investment can be favorable to the state, as it is in the PRC, the USSR and Vietnam.<sup>149</sup>

Although Garcia promised not to nationalize other foreign-owned operations, the simple mention of nations like the PRC, the USSR and Vietnam made many uncomfortable.

The leftward swing, although it upset some Peruvians and members of the international community, was not as radical as it appeared. As we shall see, Garcia was simply using his incredible popularity (He had a 90% approval rating as of his first three months in office.) to force through many of his

reform ideas, particularly the programs he thought most risky.

#### 14. 1985: Further Reforms

In other areas of government, Garcia followed through on his campaign promises, particularly in the most crucial area, economics. As expected, in late July foreign currency and certificates of deposit were frozen for ninety days, the sol devalued 12% and prices of basic products frozen at July, 1986 levels. Interest rates were reduced as specified in Castro's plan, and a price freeze was established on all goods, services and rents.<sup>150</sup>

The effects of these initial measures was mixed. Production and sales dropped 10% over the next few weeks as the devaluation and price freezes saw millions of soles leave the private sector for the Central Bank and treasury, creating a cash and credit squeeze. Manuel Moreyra declared that, "The program is highly recessive, the most monetarist ever carried out here."<sup>151</sup> On the positive side, inflation and interest rates did drop.

Other immediate steps taken by Garcia included a wage increase of 22% for teachers, 15% for state workers and an increased minimum wage. Garcia promised to create new jobs through tax and financial incentives. Councils were created in different regions throughout the country to promote basic health, education, agriculture, housing and electricity improvements. Special priority was given to twelve regions in the south stricken by terrorism.<sup>152</sup>

There were some holes in the Garcia plan as he did not mention plans to cut government spending, come closer to balanced budget or exactly how to ease out of the economic freeze without causing inflation.

Garcia also began to attack areas of non-economic concern. On August 19, in an attempt to curb corruption, 37 police officers , including 13 plainclothes men, were forced to resign. Concerning terrorism, Garcia called the Shining Path, a violent, left wing terrorist group, "Ayatollah-like fundamentalists", and said he would act against them through, "law enforcement."<sup>153</sup> Drugs were also a major area of concern, as they were the number one export for Peru and provided \$500 million dollars to traffickers. Garcia pledged to work closer with the U.S. and Columbia to reduce drug production. Between those three nations, Operation Condor was formed to begin raids on drug production factories.<sup>154</sup> In September of 1985, 41 senior police officers were fired for suspected involvement in the drug trade.<sup>155</sup>

In October of 1985, Garcia presented the October Plan, which carried earlier reforms further. It outlined a large influx of government funds into a wide range of programs, including more wage increases, jobs, inducements to buy national products, banning of some 216 non-essential imports, tax changes to encourage exports and necessary imports (especially aimed at agriculture), incentives for fishing and mining industries and large amounts of money for the worsening terrorist-stricken south.<sup>156</sup>

The economy continued to recess as it adjusted to the

tightening of the money supply. Companies were losing large amounts of their profits and as a result were beginning to illegally raise prices to avoid bankruptcy. A continued problem was how to put capital back into the system without causing inflation. Businessmen began to complain in late November, 1985, that "earning money in Peru can be dangerous",<sup>157</sup> as government continued to pass legislation taxing company profits in an attempt to build up the capital base of the country. Companies were being forced to disguise their profits to stay in business. The economy was clearly in recession as growth slowed in many sectors, particularly construction, down 11% from the year before. Growth was at 2.5%, not the 3.3% the government had hoped for.<sup>158</sup>

International as well as domestic pressure began to mount for Garcia. In late October of 1985, U.S. Federal bank regulators downgraded Peru's loans to "substandard", as a reprisal against Peru's unorthodox approach to repaying debt. The result of this action was no further loans in the near future for Peru and a tightening of credit lines for international commerce. Garcia maintained a strong stance, complaining that, "We are now enduring reprisals for adopting a nationalistic stance."<sup>159</sup> Washington also denied Peru important equipment it had requested to fight drug trafficking.

The struggle against terrorism and drugs was not making the progress that government officials had hoped for either. One Lima official complained, "Peru, the largest producer of coca, has continued to eradicate the crop, but only with limited

success because of terrorist attacks against the American-financed workers."<sup>160</sup> In September of 1985, Shining Path guerillas killed 14 people and damaged an electric plant.<sup>161</sup> Worse than that, the terrorists began to move from their traditional area of operations in the countryside to Lima, demonstrated by the attack against the U.S. Ambassador's residence in response to the American bombing of Libya in April of 1986.

#### 15. 1986: Garcia Moderates Stance

In January of 1986, Garcia began to react to the domestic and international pressure. He loosened control over the economy and tried to spur growth through increased wages and better availability of credit. The short-term results of these measures was small, however, as there was little increase in growth.

A more striking development was a softer stand by Garcia concerning international credit and the IMF. Faced with the likelihood of a further reduction in Peru's loan status, Garcia was forced to "play ball" with the IMF and other creditors. He allowed an IMF negotiating team to travel to Peru and review the status of its loans, a move Garcia had promised he would not do. He also agreed to a new round of meetings to take place in Washington or New York in the upcoming months.<sup>162</sup>

#### 16. Conclusions

The continued unsteady growth of the economy and increased terrorism at home forced Garcia to alter his domestic policies, while growing international pressure led to a alteration of his



stance on the IMF. The situation in the Spring of 1986, then, is uncertain. Garcia was successful in implementing an amazing number of reforms, both domestically and in foreign policy, covering a wide range of areas, but emphasizing economics. Many of these reforms, however, may simply be pebbles against the brick wall of problems which face Peru. It is too early to tell.

The APRA party of Peru has had a amazing history. Throughout its past, a host of adjectives could describe its behavior and character: rebellious, violent, elitist, populist, conservative, unpopular, concessional, bureaucratic, divided, weak, renewed and finally, victorious. These words reflect the dynamic and often contradictory nature of the party.

For the first four decades, APRA was dominated by Haya de la Torre, whose term could be characterized initially by confrontation and reform, but for the most part was opportunistic and pragmatic.

In the sixties the party saw little growth and by the late seventies and the death of Haya, the effectiveness and attractiveness of APRA platforms was minimal.

The late seventies and early eighties witnessed the most dramatic and eventually effective reform process within the party. Beginning with the reformist ideas and aggression of Armando Villanueva, APRA began an opening-up and democratisation of party structures which allowed an important influx of new ideas and young leaders into party hierarchy. The result of this new leftward swing, youth and open nature of the party was the emergence of Alan Garcia as a compromise candidate, apparently

healing the historic division within APRA that had become more pronounced after the death of Haya.

Garcia provided the party and Peru with a vision of hope and protest, a vital boost of confidence for a nation suffering from overwhelming economic and social problems. The image of Garcia, in addition to the political void on the left after the failure of AP, gave APRA the necessary ingredients for a successful electoral campaign. Garcia allowed APRA to escape from many of the limitations and reputations of the past, leading it to a new beginning.

The victory by Garcia and APRA is important in that a reformist, democratically-elected party had risen to power in Latin America. The success or failure of his administration has widespread repercussions. If he manages to truly reform Peru and lead it out of economic and political turmoil, his government will be an example to other nations and affect how Latin nations view themselves, as well as and how they are treated by others. However, if unsuccessful, Peru will likely remain a country with overwhelming problems, providing little hope for the troubled nations of Latin America.

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